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## THE CHINESE OPIUM WARS AND BRITISH-JEWS

"A hell-hound that doth hunt us all to death: That dog, that had his teeth before his eyes, To worry lambs and lap their gentle blood, That foul defacer of God's handiwork, That excellent grand tyrant of the earth, That reigns in galled eyes of weeping souls, Thy womb let loose, to chase us to our graves."

Richard III, Act IV, Scene IV.

In Shanghai: City for Sale, ps. 6-7, published in 1940 by Harcourt-Brace & Co., New York, we read:

"This British desire for a wider sphere of operations precipitated Britain's first war with China" (in 1842). "It was called the 'Opium War' because the British urge to swamp China with India-grown opium and Chinese refusal to take it were its tangible cause.

"There is no doubt about the wanton aggression that marked the beginning of this undeclared war, nor about the singular brutality with which the British soldiers sacked peaceful cities, burned public buildings, looted, plundered and murdered . . . There was much ruthless bayoneting. Sacred temple quarters were soiled, exquisite wood carvings were used for camp fires. And British soldiers watched old men, women and even children cutting each other's throats in utter despair, or drowning themselves. 'The lament of the fatherless, the anarchy, the starvation, and the misery of the homeless wanderers', says the East India Committee of the Colonial Society in London in 1843, 'are the theme of a frightful triumph.'"

The famous Sassoon family, probably the most influential Jewish family in England today and one of the few intimate with the last three generations of the Royal Family, established their wealth and power in the Opium Wars.

"\* \* \* David Sassoon began with a rug factory and banking establishment, but he soon recognized the opportunities in opium . . . deft maneuvering netted him the most valuable prize an Indian merchant could strive for—a monopoly of the opium trade." \* \* \*

"David's sons were bright. There was Elias, the first Sassoon to go out to the China Seas. He went over as early as 1844, in the wake of the Opium War which had given British traders the right to dump into China all the opium India and the Near East could grow. Selling the drug to 400,000,000 customers, Elias was spectacularly successful."

American Mercury, January 1940, p. 61.

Sir Edward Sassoon, the second baronet (Albert Abdullah's son, born in Bombay in 1856) married Baron Gustave de Rothschild's daughter. He resided in London and became a major in the Duke of Cambridge's Hussars Yeomanry; his daughter Sybil married the fifth Marquis of Cholmondely; King Edward VII considered him a friend; and the burghers of Hythe sent him into the House of Commons." Ibid. p. 63.

"It was the time of the great opium trade. The poppy fields of India and the Near East yielded a golden harvest, and British ships brought the sweet-smelling product to China's distant ports. David Sassoon was rich and powerful." Shanghai: City for Sale, p. 275.

"Most of the immense Sassoon fortune, in fact, had been made in the opium trade. They had shipped the precious drug from India to Shanghai, and they had cleared millions of pounds. The old firm of E. D. Sassoon had been prominent in Shanghai's famous opium combine. Shanghailanders were familiar with the name. The Sassoons had drawn much money out of Shanghai; if Sir Victor was to bring all that money back to the Settlement, there was a certain measure of retributive justice in his move." Ibid. ps. 274-275.

"No one knew how much money Sir Victor carried in his hip pocket when he landed in Shanghai (1931). Some said eighty-five million; others, three hundred \* \* \* He invested. He bought. He bought everything that could be had for money and plenty could be had for money, in Shanghai. \* \* \* He took over the vast Nanking Road holdings of Silas Aaron Hardoon. \* \* \* He accepted the chairmanship in his family's old establishment, E. D. Sassoon & Co., Ltd., bankers, merchants, industrialists. He controlled the Yangtze Finance Company and the International Investment Trust." Ibid., p. 277.

"The Sassoon pedigree goes back to King David," and "Sir Victor was the white boss of Shanghai," says the American Mercury of January 1940.

This Sir Victor Sassoon recently arrived in the United States with éclat, issued a series of belligerent challenges to the Japanese,

and indicated a strong desire to involve the United States in a program, which could not fail to protect his Far Eastern interests, while simultaneously endangering our peace and that of China. The New York Sun of February 2, 1940, gives an interesting account of the Sassoon family and of Sir Victor Sassoon in particular:

"\* \* This old-established firm also has been deep in the swirl of international politics and knows its way around the world and down through the centuries. Sir Victor Sassoon, British financier, arriving in San Francisco from the Orient, says, 'You Americans have got Japan absolutely cold, and all business people in Japan know it.' He was talking about the voiding of the trade treaty and Japan's dependence on American imports.

"During most of the nineteenth century, the Sassoons built a vast fortune in India, principally in cotton, jute, textiles and shellac. In 1929, political unrest in India caused Sir Victor to shift base, as the family has done, through the centuries, in Toledo, Venice, Salonika, Constantinople, Jerusalem, Safed and Bagdad. He put over some big, fast deals in silver, branched out in real estate and is now known as the wealthiest white man in the Far East. His interests include banks, mills, textiles, hotels, wharves, liquor-importing companies, laundries, bus lines and night clubs."

During the recent Municipal elections in Shanghai, when the Japanese attempted to increase their membership on the Governing Council, a "mysterious" individual possessed of enormous real estate holdings in Shanghai, effected a coup by breaking up his holdings into 1,200 component parts, thus increasing the British dominance of the Council. No one but Sir Victor Sassoon owned enough Shanghai real estate to accomplish this.

Considering the recent revival of interventionist talk on the Far Eastern problem, let us regard the words of Boake Carter and Thomas Healy in their book, Why Meddle in the Orient, (ps. 17 to 28, inc.)

Dr. Thomas Healy is a distinguished scholar, teacher and Dean of the Foreign Service School of the old and noted Georgetown University in the Nation's Capital.

"They demanded not only more trade on terms more advantageous to themselves, but demanded even a vicious contraband trade. Thus we come to the most sordid of historic narratives—the Opium War of 1839—as a result of which the Western World first forced its will and desires upon China and, over her prostrate form, extracted those 'sacred' treaty rights, about which the statesmen have said so much lately.

"Few Americans realize that, while opium is always as-

sociated with the Chinese, actually China used little or no opium until its use was forced upon them in huge quantities by the British Government and its agents in India.

"The growing and sale of Indian opium was a British Government monopoly, which poured a golden stream of profits into the British Treasury. The British agents foresaw even greater profits if the defenceless Chinese were made to absorb more Indian opium. The Chinese Government, fully realizing the degenerative qualities of this drug, bitterly protested. It attempted to bar its importation, sale and use. The British ignored the ban, whereupon the Chinese Government, in desperation, seized large quantities of British opium stored in Canton warehouses. Promptly Britain's Royal Navy went into action and the Opium War was on.

"Cries of indignation have rent the air over recent events in the Far East, with most of the crying being done by London and Washington. \* \* \* There was no declaration of war by the British Government. There was no official explanation given to the public, other than that the Chinese had flaunted the British prestige, property and flag. \* \* \*

"Dictating the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, closing the Opium War, Great Britain compelled the Chinese to pay an indemnity of \$21,000,000, of which \$6,000,000 was reimbursement for the destroyed opium — destroyed by the Chinese when the British insisted on forcing it into China against the latter's will. \* \*

"It was only through the debauchery of China in the Opium War that Britain directly, and the United States indirectly, obtained their 'sacred' treaty rights to establish themselves in the great port of Shanghai against the wishes of the Chinese people.

"The crowning point \* \* \* was the fact that the Treaty of Nanking never touched the immediate cause of the war—the illegal importation of opium! The Chinese were made to pay for the war, but the illicit imports of the deadly weed continued to flow unabated, to the moral and physical decay of millions of Chinese, and to the great financial profit of the British Government.

"This war nauseated most historians, including British men of letters. Justin McCarthy declared: 'Reduced to plain words, the principle for which we fought in the China War was the right of Great Britain to force a peculiar trade upon a foreign people, in spite of the protestations of the Government, and all such public opinion as there was, of the nation.' The great British statesman, Gladstone, declared: 'A war more unjust in its origins, a war more calculated to cover this country with permanent disgrace, I do not know and have not read of. The British flag is hoisted to protect an infamous traffic; and if it was never hoisted except as it is

now hoisted on the coast of China, we should recoil from its sight with horror'.

\* \* "Many American traders had a profitable role in the opium traffic. A group of American merchants formally petitioned Congress to assist Great Britain, France and Holland with a naval demonstration. Our merchant group discreetly refrained from endorsing the illicit, degenerating opium traffic, but nobly insisted that other Chinese ports should be 'opened', and their trade there protected!

"This was probably the first time that a formal request for military co-operation by the United States with Great Britain and other Western powers was proposed to achieve what was camouflaged as a common Far East objective. The same proposition has been made again in the past few months and doubtless will be made again.

"The merchants' petition was discussed in Congress, March, 1840. The Hon. Caleb Cushing, who soon after negotiated our first treaty with China, declared: 'But God forbid that I should entertain the idea of co-operating with the British Government in the purpose, if purpose it has, in upholding the base cupidity and violence and high-handed infraction of all law, human and divine, which have characterized the operations of the British, individually and collectively, in the Seas of China . . . I trust the idea will no longer be entertained in England that she will receive aid or countenance from the United States in that nefarious enterprise'.

"Thus was China 'opened' to the trade of the Western World. Thus were the 'rights' to reside and trade in Shanghai and other Chinese ports obtained. Thus was the first proposal for Anglo-American military co-operation in the Far East turned down by the United States."

"The first Opium War led to more wars. In 1857-58, Great Britain was again one of the belligerents. This time she was aided by France. This war was known as the Second Opium War or the Arrow War." \* \*

"And, once again, as in the first Opium War, there grew up a persistent drive in the United States and in Britain to inveigle America to join Britain and France in military operations in China." Foster quotes from our own official documents to show that the British were much disappointed when we made a compromise, peaceful settlement of a separate quarrel with the Chinese. The British secretly had hoped for U. S. aid in the war they were planning against the Chinese."

(We are reminded here that London was much annoyed and disappointed—according to the New York Times—when the United

States settled the Panay incident without prior agreement with the British Government.)

"The United States Government formally answered the British Government that military expeditions into Chinese territory could not be undertaken without consent of Congress; that U. S. relations with China did not warrant resort to war. Mr. Reed, United States Minister to China, in conveying these advices to the Allies, officially reported their chagrin and dismay as they had been 'encouraged in the most extravagant expectation of co-operation on our part, to the extent even of acquisition of territory. \* \* \* and that the English were especially irritable at their inability to involve the United States in their unworthy quarrel.'

Why Meddle in the Orient, p. 28.

"A word here as to the British role in our acquisition of the Philippines is necessary to get a rounded picture of what Bemis calls, 'the greatest mistake in the history of American diplomacy."

"The British were very much worried that Germany would take over the Philippine Islands. As Germany was becoming a stronger rival of Britain in all parts of the world, this was the last thing the British wanted to happen.

"Furthermore, the British wanted the United States to take a physical place in the Far East, where it might support British policy to keep China open to Western trade, which was predominantly British trade. If the British could maneuver us into not only an increasing trade stake but actual territory in the Far East, it would be much easier for Britain to obtain American co-operation in helping Britain preserve her Far Eastern stake, which was becoming more and more menaced by Germany and others.

Ibid. p. 61.

". . . Simultaneously, Britain fought the Boer War. from 1899-1902, by which she annexed a large part of South Africa. War was narrowly averted between Great Britain and Germany, who favored the Boers. The Boer War was almost universally condemned throughout the world, except by the United States—the British reciprocated this friendly tolerance by being almost the only nation in the world that did not consider our war with Spain as an offense against civilization." Ibid. p. 68.

Upon the same consideration and for the same reason the British favored our annexation of the Philippines.

"It is astounding, but, nevertheless true, that not until 1928, thirty years after the event, were the American people able to learn how the Hay notes were prepared. Documents recently published show that in substance these notes fol-

lowed the draft of Mr. Alfred E. Hippisley (a British subject formerly connected with the Chinese Customs Service) who worked through Hay's confidential advisor on Far Eastern affairs, W. W. Rockhill. The same two gentlemen were instrumental in formulating the later notes of 1900, leading to the implication of preserving Chinese territorial and administrative entity." (The Hay referred to was John Hay, American Secretary of State and father-in-law of Anglophile, war-mongering Congressman James Wadsworth, co-author of the Conscription Bill.)

"This incident emphasizes two things which Americans as a whole have not known: First, the British initiative in establishing what was presumably an American policy; second, the failure (which is not unusual) to acquaint the American people with all the facts until many years after the event." Ibid. ps. 77-78.

"\* \* Our troops have been kept in China under authority of an international agreement that was never submitted to the Senate or the Congress, or the people of the United States. \* \* They were put there and continued there largely through dictation of the Executive branch of the Government, even though Congress may not have raised the question and has passed general appropriations for our U. S. military forces without special comment." Ibid. p. 87.

"When the Allies were hard pressed by the German submarine warfare, Japan obtained secret agreements from Great Britain (February, 1917), France (March, 1917), Russia (March, 1917), and later Italy, that they would support at the end of the war Japan's claims to Shantung and certain German islands which are now Japanese 'mandates'.

"For reasons of understandable delizacy, the Allies carefully concealed these agreements from the United States, although they openly explained their secret agreements in reference to the general reconstruction (?) of the map of Europe. As the Allies slyly intended to use us as the instrument for bringing China into the war on their side, they possibly thought it best not to embarrass us in advance with the knowledge that arrangements had already been made to give a part of the territory of one Ally, China, to another Ally, Japan...

"In April, 1917, the United States joined the Allies in the conflict in Europe. \* \* Soon after we entered the World War we persuaded the Chinese Republic—which was badly battered by internal strife among the Chinese—to do likewise." Ibid. ps. 105-106.

Thus we see that the identification of British-Jewish foreign policy with our Anglophile statesmen is no new thing. It is not likely that the American people understood then—or, for that matter,

understand today—that when we helped the British win the Opium Wars, defeat the Boers and implement their Far Eastern policy, and fought the World War, we were, in truth, pulling British-Jewish chestnuts out of the fire. That our miscalled "statesmen" must have suspected something of the sort, however, is evident in their efforts to conceal the truth from Congress and the people.

See: Why Meddle in the Orient, by Carter and Healy;
Far Eastern Policy of the United States, by Griswold;
A Diplomatic History of the United States, by Bemis.
American Diplomacy in the Orient, by Foster.

Propaganda in the Next War by Sidney Rogerson, published in England under the auspices of the British Government and edited by the noted military expert, Captain Liddell Hart, contains instructions as to how England can win this war and involve the United States. He states:

"\* \* To persuade her (America) to take our part will be much more difficult, so difficult as to be unlikely to succeed. It will need a definite threat to America, a threat, moreover, which will have to be brought home by propaganda to every citizen, before the republic will again take arms in an external quarrel. THE POSITION WILL NATURALLY BE CONSIDERABLY EASED IF JAPAN WERE INVOLVED AND THIS MIGHT AND PROBABLY WOULD BRING AMERICA IN WITHOUT FURTHER ADO. At any rate, it would be a natural and obvious object of our propagandists to achieve this, just as during the Great War they succeeded in embroiling the United States with Germany.

(p. 148)

Quoting a high government official in Amsterdam, Frazier Hunt, the famous correspondent says:

"We are victims of our own busybody friends," he told me, "England would like nothing better than to drag America into the war through the back door. If the Allies are able to involve America in the Far East against Japan it would remove from the Allies the responsibility for checking Japan in China and fighting her in the event she should decide to join up with Germany. Feeding America the idea that Japan is planning an invasion of the Dutch East Indies fans bitterness which might break into flames."